This paper seeks to uncover an inconvenient truth. The Microsoft decisions are not tying cases.
Retailers bought less than 2000 copies of it. 5 Ironically, it was suggested that those copies may have been bought by IT geeks willing to have a copy of the first software ever designed by DG
COMP. 6
In 2009, the Commission stroke again. It opened infringement proceedings against Microsoft, this time in relation to the tying of IE with Windows. Albeit similar in nature to Microsoft I, the main feature of this case is that Microsoft offered commitments, and the Commission closed the procedure. First, Microsoft undertook to enable users and OEMS to turn IE off and on. Second, Microsoft undertook to display a ballot screen to IE users (via Windows Update), with a view to give them an opportunity to install one of the 12 browsers with the largest usage share. 7 The effectiveness of those remedies remains a bone of contention. Recently, the New York Times indicated that those remedies had barely affected browsers markets. 8 In contrast, others argue that Microsoft's market share in the web browser market is gradually falling, as a result of the ballot screen remedy. 9
II. The Microsoft Cases involve no Coercion of Customers
In both the US and the EU, a key, standard feature of tying cases is that customers are "coerced" (or forced) to purchase the tied product. 10 Put simply, coercion arises if the sale of the tying product is conditioned on the purchase of the tied product. The problem with coercion is twofold.
First, coercion may lead a customer to acquire supplementary products/services which it does not need at all. For instance, a customer that enjoys his own transport means may be forced to purchase bus transportation services to the airport when booking a flight ticket. There is here an "exploitation" problem.
Second, coercion may restrict a customer's freedom of choice amongst supplementary products/services which it needs to acquire. 11 With coercion, the customer is automatically directed to, or locked in, the dominant firm's tied product/service at the expense of rival products/services. There is here an "exclusion" problem. Customers who must take the dominant firm tied products/services forego resources (money, space, other) which could be invested in alternative products/services. In Hilti, the Commission sanctioned the tying of cartridge strips with nails. 12 Customers that had acquired the dominant firm's tied nails were held to have foregone their freedom of choice regarding the source of their nails which, in turn, excluded independent nail makers. 13 Importantly, this type of coercion can only arise if the tied product is 10 Absent any such tie, standard economic theory predicts that consumers will turn to competitive products. Coercion may take the form of a physical tie (a common packaging) or of an economic tie (a rebate on the purchase of the two products). 11 The rulings of the EU courts in Hoffmann La Roche and Hilti cast light on this issue. The judgments of the Community courts are replete with references to the fact that coercion entails a restriction of customers' freedom of choice. In Hoffmann La Roche, for instance, the ECJ held that the dominant firm tied its customer in a way to "[d]eprive the purchaser or restrict his possible choice of sources of supply and to deny other products access to the market" ( a "rivalrous good" or, in other words, a product whose acquisition prevents/limits the acquisition of other, substitutable, products (notably those of rivals) 14 .
In its two Microsoft decisions, the Commission contended that Microsoft had coerced customers. 15 However, on the facts, this allegation seems disputable. In those cases, there was no coercion, because media players and Internet browsers are non-rivalrous goods which are distributed for free. 16 Due to the possibility of "multi-homing", i.e. the ability for customers, to acquire, install and use several Internet browsers/media players on a single PC, 17 customer's freedom of choice was wholly preserved. In addition, from a technical perspective, the limited file size of most Internet browsers and media players, as well as the development of "cloud computing" meant that the share of hard disk memory devoted to additional softwares became increasingly trivial.
Finally, the so-called "positive feedback loop" which had arguably created a network effect contributing to "guide" consumers towards Microsoft in the WMP case, was clearly absent from the IE case. 18 14 We slightly stretch the classic definition of what a rivalrous good is here. Traditionally, rivalry relates to a situation where "Everyone technically can use the good, but the use of the good by one person detracts from the ability of others to enjoy the good". (J. TAYLOR and A. WEERAPANA, Economics, South-Western College Pub, 6 th ed., 2009, p. 435). We shift from a situation where the use of one good limits the ability of another person to use that same good, to a situation where the use of one good limits the ability of that same user to use another good. 15 The decision indicates that "customers are not given a choice" because Microsoft softwares come "pre-installed" with Windows and cannot "be un-installed". Hence, the Commission found that the third constituent element of illegal tying pursuant to Article 102 TFEU -i.e. the fact that "the conclusion of contracts is made subject to the acceptance of supplementary obligations" -would be met. GC, 17 Sept. 2007, op. cit., para. 827. 16 On its side, the Commission stated that no monetary sacrifice was required for a tying abuse to be proven as "the wording of paragraph (d) of Article 82 does not include a reference to "paying" when introducing the element of a "supplemental" obligation". In a multi-homing market, there is a priori no reason why a buyer should choose to acquire a single product only, at the exclusion of the other. 18 In the WMP case, the Commission took concern that content providers had a compelling economic incentive to code their products within Microsoft's proprietary music format (WMA) in order to reach a majority of PC users, which in turn reinforced the popularity of that platform with users. conducive to leveraging because of "end-users inertia". The Commission explained that users did not switch to rival softwares through downloading. This was due to barriers such as searching, choosing and installing a competing software, which could stem from a lack of technical skills. 20 In Microsoft II, the Commission relied on empirical analyses to confirm its findings. A consumer survey showed that a majority of users (51%) had not downloaded alternative browsers.
Such factual findings would in themselves, deserve lengthy discussions, notably on the risks of errors due to "framing" issues when conducting empirical surveys (in other words, the way a question is asked) 21 and on the risk to witness behavioural economics backfire against competition authorities with firms challenging the partiality of the surveys ordered before
Courts. That said, on a more principled level, the Commission's manifest interest in behavioural theories of harm raises a more fundamental issue which, in the lawyer's jargon can be referred to as an imputability issue (or, in the economists' jargon an identification problem). 22 
III. The Microsoft Cases are Disguised Refusal to Supply Cases
Besides this, there is another good sense in which the Microsoft decisions do not constitute abusive tying cases. In both cases, 24 the crux of the matter lied in reality in the fact that Windows constituted a key platform for the distribution of software to customers. The wording of the Commission's decisions is devoid of ambiguity. The Commission took concern with the fact that With this in mind, one may then question why the Commission found necessary to build tying cases, rather than using the traditional "essential facility" route. variety of plausible factual and historical reasons for this. 27 However, we believe that the Commission may have been reluctant to press refusal to deal charges for fear of failing to prove the abuse. Had the Commission followed this path, it would indeed have had to prove the demanding Bronner conditions. 28 In Bronner, the sole EU competition case involving a refusal to give access to a distribution facility, a small newspaper editor wanted to be included within the nationwide home-delivery network of a large Austrian newspaper. The ECJ dismissed the allegations of abuse. It found that for an abuse to be established, the service at stake had to be "indispensable to carry on business". In turn, according to the Court, there is only indispensability if it is impossible to replicate the distribution system at stake and if there are no alternative distribution methods 29 .
In the two Microsoft cases, the Commission would arguably have been unable to prove the Bronner conditions. First, the existence of number of competing OS to Windows showed that replication was not impossible (even on a limited basis, see for instance, Inux or MacOS).
Second, besides distribution through OS, softwares can be, and are, distributed to end users through a variety of distribution channels (for instance, Google distributes software through its search engine, etc.). As the ECJ made clear in Bronner, the existence of alternative distribution channels disqualifies a finding of an abuse "even though they may be less advantageous" 30 .
Third, the Commission had found that Microsoft benefited merely from a "competitive advantage" through pre-installation and could not demonstrate that there was an "elimination of competition" in a related market, pursuant to the last condition of the essential facilities case-law.
In light of this, it comes as no surprise that the Commission followed a "tying" theory of harm in the Microsoft cases. The test for tying abuses is indeed laxer and easier to satisfy. 31 Moreover, on procedural grounds, the selection of a "tying" scenario did not preclude the negotiation of heavy "essential facility" remedies with the parties. 32 This, in turn, is because the Commission enjoys a large leeway in devising remedies under Regulation 1/2003. 33 In particular, firms which offer commitments under the Article 9 commitments procedure irreversibly accept that the concessions they make may go beyond what the Commission could have itself imposed on them 34 , even if the concerned firm was, like Microsoft, threatened to be heavily fined for recidivism.
Finally, the Commission -and the EU courts -have already applied this circumvention reasoning in other areas of abuse of dominance law. For instance, in a number of cases, the Commission has resorted to Article 102 c) to condemn discount schemes that did not fall neatly within the case-law on abusive rebates 35 .
IV. Conclusions
In conclusion, the Commission's illusionist tricks are a source of concern. First, the Microsoft decisions entail a possible reduction of the threshold for intervention in both "tying" casesthrough the obliteration of the coercion requirement -and "essential facility" cases -through the use of circumvention tactics. 36 The cumulative effect of these two trends leads to a dangerous collapse of the standard of proof for refusal to supply cases which can now be proven by mixing a weakened tying standard with elements of behavioral economics.
Second, the application of radically different remedies to similar cases -which range from "untying" to "must carry" solutions -is somewhat problematic. Dominant firms willing to comply ex ante with the competition rules in high tech industries face now two polar options, with opposite practical consequences. In this context, it should be noted that must carry remedies 32 It is noteworthy that subject to compliance with the "proportionality" principle (which entails, amongst other things the prevalence of behavioural over structural remedies), EU competition law does not ascribe specific remedies to particular types of abuses. Absent a formal nexus between the remedy and the suspected abuse, the Commission could thus apply "must carry" remedies which went possibly beyond conventional remedies in tying cases. 33 
